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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this study we document the changes of corporate design of modern Specified 
Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs) from 2003 to 2012. We assign the 
impact on changes of SPACs to each of the three groups of stakeholders: 
founders, investors and underwriters and test whether institutional characteristics 
of SPACs determine the success of their merger outcomes. We document that 
SPACs significantly redesigned its structure in the period under observation. 
Additionally, the probability of the merger for SPACs is increasing if they are 
able to; announce the deal soon after the IPO, focus that deal on China and have 
their IPO underwritten by EarlyBirdCapital   
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1. Introduction 
 
 
Although Specified Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs) have been in the existence 
in different forms in the U.S capital markets since early 1920s,
1
 their corporate structure became 
intensely debated only recently. A major trigger for the increased interest in SPACs is the 
innovation in their structure as the response to regulation from the Security and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) of the speculative blank check market in the late 1990s.
2
 EarlyBirdCapital, a 
midsize investment bank underwrote a successful initial public offering (IPO) for Millstream 
Acquisition Corporation in August 2003, complying with all blank check market regulation. The 
event triggered intense activity in the capital markets with SPACs representing 23% of IPOs in 
2007 and 34% in 2008 (Ritter 2008).
3
 
After few papers in the legal literature explained the characteristics of recent SPACs
4
, Jog 
and Sun (2007) and Boyer and Baigent (2008) were the first to vouch for the more intense 
research on SPACs in financial literature. Jog and Sun (2007) examine characteristics of SPACs 
and refer to the SEC's definition as "a blank check company is a development stage company 
that has no specific business plan, or purpose, or has indicated its business plan is to engage in a 
merger or acquisition with an unidentified company, other entity, or person." A SPAC is created 
to pool funds in order to finance a merger or acquisition opportunity within a set time-frame. The 
opportunity usually has yet to be identified.
5
 
                                                 
1
 “The American “investment” trusts functioned as blind speculative pools, administered in many cases by men of 
reputation and ability who were carried away by the universal madness. These new “creations” played a double role 
in intensifying the speculative orgy, for they were themselves both active speculators and active media of 
speculation.” ,Graham and Dodd (1934). 
2
 In late 1990s the Security and Exchange Commission revoked licensees to more than 10 blank check market 
promoters at the time which lead to complete cease of their market. 
3
 Renaissance Capital confirms the percentage for 2007 and reports that SPACs were 35% of IPO activity in 2008  
4
 Hale (2007), Heyman (2007), Reimer (2007), Sjostrom (2007). 
5
 http://www.sec.gov/answers/blankcheck.htm . 
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A SPAC is a clean shell company
6
 that acquires public status through the unit IPO and is 
specifically formed to purchase one or more operating businesses over a certain amount of time, 
usually two years. Proceeds raised through the IPO are placed in escrow accounts with a credible 
financial institution, and are kept there until SPAC founders are able to close a deal with 
potential targets. If an appropriate target is not found within the two-year period after the IPO, 
the SPAC is liquidated and funds from the escrow accounts are returned to investors. Units 
issued by SPACs are immediately tradable, while trading with warrants and shares starts after the 
date by which underwriter exercise overallotment rights.
7
 On average, trading of warrants and 
common shares starts four weeks after the IPO. SPACs used to be traded on AMEX and OTC 
Bulletin Board. However, since 2008, SPAC shares are listed on NYSE and NASDAQ. Three 
groups of stakeholders have primary incentive in the success of SPACs and the execution of a 
merger as the final outcome, namely: SPAC founders, SPAC underwriters, and SPAC investors. 
Within a short period of time, many studies on SPACs developed.
8
 Due to the increase in 
the volume and occurrence of SPACs in capital markets, Lewellen (2009) called for the 
recognition of SPACs as a new class of financial asset. However, concurrently with Lewellen’s 
suggestion, the market for SPACs almost ceased with only one SPAC conducting the initial 
public offering in 2009. It took more than a year for SPACs to revive. In May 2010, 57
th
 Street 
Acquisition Company went public as a blank check SPAC company, this time having vastly 
redesigned corporate structure. 
                                                 
6
 A  shell company as a company
±
 that is now or at any time previously has been an issuer, that has: (A) No or 
nominal operations; and (B) Either:  
(1)  No or nominal assets;  
(2)  Assets consisting solely of cash and cash equivalents; or 
(3)  Assets consisting of any amount of cash and cash equivalents and nominal other assets. 
http://www.rule144solution.com/ShellCompany.asp . 
7
 The sale of shares by the underwriters in excess of those shares initially available. 
8
 Berger (2008), Hale (2007), Lewellen (2009), Floros and Travis (2011). 
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We document changes in the corporate design of SPACs and explain their evolution. 
Additionally, we examine the impact of SPAC stakeholders on the success of merger. None of 
these issues are fully explained in the current literature on SPACs. 
The current literature on SPACs attempt to analyze various aspects such as; the 
institutional structure, the incentives of major stakeholders, the performance of issued securities 
and the factors determining successful mergers executed by SPACs.  
Studies on the institutional structure and design of SPAC securities refer to Schultz 
(1993), Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) and Garner and Marshal (2007). Schultz (1993) 
models why companies use units, a bundle of common stock and warrants, during the initial 
public offering. And why they commit to issue more stocks in a future date at the warrant’s 
exercise price. He finds that the major obstacles are: their small size, low earnings and low value 
of assets. Additionally, he sees units as the solution for the agency-cost problem resulting from 
the free cash flow awarded to managers at the time of the IPO.   
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) maintain that unit IPO solves the information 
asymmetry problems and enables companies that are considered risky by outsiders, to signal 
their true value. Garner and Marshal (2007) empirically test the predictions of Schultz (1993) 
and Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997). They find that risky firms assign a higher proportion of 
firm value to the warrants at the time of the IPO and increase the underpricing.  
Boyer and Baigent (2007) and Jog and Sun (2007) confirm the prediction from the 
baseline papers: SPACs’ initial public offerings are relatively small in size, averaging less than 
$100 million. They also report that SPACs have a very low value of assets and earnings. 
Contrary to Garner and Marshal (2007), both Boyer and Baigent (2008) and Jog and Sun (2007) 
5 
 
find that SPAC units do not experience any significant underpricing.
9
 Chakraborty et al. (2011) 
provide a theoretical explanation for the possibility for the lack of the underpricing of unit IPOs. 
They find the optimal ratio of stocks and warrants in a unit.  
Jog and Sun (2007) and Thompson (2011) examine the incentives of the three major 
stakeholders group of SPACs: founders, underwriters and investors. Jog and Sun report that for 
their sample of SPACs, covering the period from 2003 to 2006, managers of successful SPACs 
earned on average 19 times their initial investment. Hale (2007) and later Thompson (2011) 
report that on average underwriters receive compensation of around 7% of gross proceeds 
obtained at the offering. Lewellen (2009) and Thompson (2011) report that part of underwriters’ 
compensation is deferred until consummation of the merger.  
For its investors SPACs are essentially a risk-free note plus a call option
10
 where the 
maturity of the note is usually two years. The options expiration date represents the end of the 
prespecified deal period where the option's strike price is equal to the expected per-share trust 
amount at the expiration date. Performance of SPAC securities are examined in studies that 
mostly focus on the performance of common shares and do not perceive SPACs as a risk-free 
debt plus a call option.
11
 
Jog and Sun (2007) report negative overall performance of around 22% to the investors 
holding common stock of SPACs. Similarly, Lewellen (2009) report a negative 2% monthly 
return. Tran (2010) focuses on post-merger announcement returns and reports a 1.7% monthly 
return to investors after the announcement date. Lakicevic and Vulanovic (2013), in addition to 
                                                 
9
 The finding that SPACs do not experience any underpricing is confirmed also in Lewellen (2009), Thompson 
(2010), Lakicevic and Vulanovic (2011) and Ignatyeva et al. (2012) using larger sample of SPACs both in the U.S 
and European markets. 
10
 At the early years of SPACs entrance to the market the unit would consist of two warrants and one share.  
11
 Major obstacle for the analysis of the complete financial structure of SPAC is the lack in the trading data on 
warrants. 
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the analysis of SPACs’ common shares, analyze post-announcement returns of SPACs’ units 
warrants. They report negative share performance after the announcement for common stock, but 
positive returns for holders of units and holders of warrants. Ignatyeva et al. (2012) report 
performance of 2.5% after the announcement of the merger, and attribute it to returns on the risk-
free note rather than a signal of potential quality of the SPAC. Datar et al. (2012), states that 
operational performance of SPAC acquired firms are significantly inferior to their industry peers 
and to contemporaneous IPO firms. They report that after the merger, SPAC acquired companies 
have higher leverage, are smaller in size, have lower investment levels, and have lower growth 
opportunities than the firms that conduct a conventional IPO. While comparing SPACs’ 
performances with the sample of similar IPOs, they report negative returns in the long term for 
both groups and underperformance of SPACs relative to the peer IPO’s. In general, they 
recommend that investors stay away from SPACs. Rodrigues and Stegemoller (2012) report that 
SPACs do not exhibit IPO underpricing, with initial returns near zero and gross spreads similar 
to the traditional IPOs. Howe and O’Brien (2012) indicate that neither managerial nor 
institutional ownership are associated with the performance of SPAC securities. 
Jenkinson and Sousa (2009) study the characteristics and performances of SPACs that 
successfully conducted a merger, and report that half of the deals were value destroyers. Tran 
(2010) using a sample from 2003 to 2008, reports that SPACs are less likely than other 
comparable IPOs to execute merger combination, and that SPACs tend to focus on acquisitions 
of private companies as their primary targets. He also reports that merger success is positively 
related to the involvement of institutions that want to invest in SPACs both pre-merger and post-
merger. Lakicevic and Vulanovic (2011) examine the major merger determinants and find a 
positive impact on SPACs’ mergers by underwriters who specialized in the SPAC market, such 
7 
 
as EarlyBirdCapital. They also find that the merger is more likely if a larger proportion of the 
money raised in the IPO is deposited in a trust fund. 
SPACs today are vastly different corporate structure than when they entered capital 
markets in 2003. The changes are partially attributed to market factors, and to the impact of 
mainly institutional investors (Lewellen (2009), Tran (2010), Vulanovic (2010), Cumming et al. 
(2012)).  Changes are also attributed to the relative underperformance of SPACs’ securities after 
the merger as reported in Jenkinson and Sousa (2009) and Datar et al. (2012). Rodrigues and 
Stegemoller (2011) examine the changes in voting mechanisms for mergers and report 
significant changes in the SPAC structure where recent SPACs require significantly lower 
number of shareholders to approve a merger. Mitchel and Pulvino (2012) recognize the impact of 
the financial crisis on SPACs, because hedge funds are affected by the withdrawal of capital 
from their own investors. They also report that even if some SPACs kept their trust funds in the 
accounts of Lehman Brothers, the trusts were unaffected by the crisis and the failure of Lehman 
Brothers. Mitchel and Pulvino (2012) reports that investors buying shares that trade below net-
asset value have the incentive to reject the deal. Some investors are possibly interested only in 
short term profits and not necessarily in the success of the SPAC. Vulanovic (2010) finds that 
hedge funds earn a 33% annual return by selling the warrant after the IPO, and waiting for face 
value payment at liquidation.
12
 The returns for leveraged investors are even higher if SPAC 
managers purchase additional shares before the merger in order to enhance an approval of an 
acquisition.
13
 
                                                 
12
 The strategy of selling warrant and waiting for redemption at liquidation date is known as “yield game.” 
13
 In an attempt to proceed with the merger combination, SPAC promoters in their proxy statements before vote 
offer this kind of advice “Prior to exercising conversion rights, shareholders should verify the market price of 
common stock, as they may receive higher proceeds from the sale of their common stock in the public market than 
from exercising their conversion rights.” 
 
8 
 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section two presents the data; section three explains 
institutional characteristics of SPACs in the period 2003 until 2012; section four reports the 
empirical tests; and section five concludes. 
2. Data 
 
 
 The data comes from various sources. The majority of the data on the institutional 
characteristics of SPACs are from SEC website and the EDGAR database. SPACs are legally 
obliged to report to the SEC all issuance activities and any major corporate changes. 
Additionally, they are required to update the SEC with financial statements on a regular basis. 
We hand collect data on important characteristics of SPACs from their initial registration S-1 
forms and update the data with information reported before the IPO event in the final 
prospectuses. The information from the SEC is summarized and represents our initial data. 
Furthermore, we cross check the data with updated public information about SPACs published 
by Morgan Joseph.
14
 In case of discrepancy, we recheck the original filings with the SEC.  
 We collect data on merger dates and cross-check merger dates reported to the SEC and 
Morgan Joseph with the reports from major business news providers, such as Yahoo and 
Bloomberg. Renaissance Capital was used as the source for annual volumes and pricing of the 
IPOs from 2003 to 2012.
15
 
To conduct the tests on merger outcomes for SPACs we collect data on the Volatility 
Index  (VIX)  from Chicago Board Option Exchange for all dates from August 2003 until August 
2012.
16
 We collect daily data from August 2003 until August 2012 on performance of Russell 
                                                 
14
 http://mjta.com/i/SPACMarketUpdate.pdf  
15
 http://www.renaissancecapital.com/IPOHome/Press/IPOPricings.aspx  
16
 http://www.cboe.com/micro/VIX/vixintro.aspx 
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2000 index from their website.
17
 Finally we collect the daily news-based Economic Policy 
Uncertainty Index for the whole period under observation.
18
 
 The sample represents the whole population of SPACs that conducted the IPO between 
August 2003 when the Millstream Acquisition SPAC conducted the IPO, and August 2012. It 
includes all 184 SPACs that went public since 2003. We divide the sample into three subgroups 
based on the timing of SPAC’s IPO. Although it seems that the division is arbitrary we assert 
that the division is due to the changes in both SPAC environment and the changes in the 
structure of SPACs. First subsample includes the period between August 2003 and December 
2006. This subsample covers the period examined in earliest studies of SPACs by Boyer and 
Baigent (2008) and Jog and Sun (2007). The second subsample includes SPACs that conducted 
the IPO between January 2007 and December 2008. It is characterized by an increased interest in 
SPACs by the large financial houses such as Citibank, Merrill Lynch, Bank of America and 
similar institutions. The third subsample includes SPACs that executed their IPO after January 
2009.  
3. Characteristics of SPACs  
 
 
This section presents the institutional characteristics and changes of the SPAC from 2003 
to 2012. Panel A in Table 1, reports the development of the SPAC market from 2003 until 2012 
for three major outcomes of SPAC: merged, liquidated and seeking for acquisition. The second 
column reports that 184 SPACs successfully executed the IPO. Out of these 184 SPACs, 98 
merged within two-year period. In total, 65 SPACs have been liquidated between 2003 and 2012, 
while 21 SPACs are still in the process of seeking for a merger opportunity. Comparing the 
                                                 
17
 http://www.russell.com/indexes/data/fact_sheets/us/russell_2000_index.asp 
18
 http://www.policyuncertainty.com/us_daily.html 
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activity over the three subsamples, both by volume and by percentage, shows that the first sub-
period was the most successful for SPACs with 53 (49%) of them being able to conclude the 
merger. Panel B of Table 1, reports annual SPACs’ activity. Judging by the absolute number of 
mergers by SPACs, the most successful year was 2007. SPACs that executed the IPO’s in years 
2004 and 2005 were also very successful. Comparing SPACs activity relative to the overall 
activity in the market for security issuance, the most successful year for SPACs was in 2008, 
when they constituted 35% of the total IPO market. 
 
3.1        SPACs’ population characteristics 
 
Characteristics for the population of SPACs are reported in Table 2, Panel A. We report 
information on a range of institutional variables that determine SPAC at its issuance and help us 
to understand them better. First, it is used to describe SPACs and their dynamic corporate design. 
Second, it describes relevant information on the determinants that potentially affect the success 
of the merger for SPACs. We have complete data on all 184 companies for the following 
characteristics: number of founding members of SPAC and their age; the amount of underwriters 
total compensation charged to SPAC founders as well as the amounts collected at the IPO and 
deferred until the merger combination; gross proceeds from the unit IPO; amount of proceeds 
deposited in the trust account after the IPO and kept there until the merger or liquidation; warrant 
exercise price as determined in the pre-IPO prospectus; the number of warrants issued per unit; 
the offering price of the unit at the IPO date; the number of underwriters in the syndicate; and the 
quality of the lead underwriter and finally the classification for the market sentiment. We also 
11 
 
report on threshold level of investors needed to disapprove a merger and thus cause liquidation 
of the SPAC after two years. 
SPAC managers or founders are entrepreneurs with different background who with initial 
investment of $ 25000 register the clean shell company and take it to the IPO. Thompson (2011) 
in detail reports the characteristics of SPAC sponsors and our statistics is similar to one reported 
there. Although we use almost all SPAC founders’ characteristics reported in Thompson (2011) 
in later part of our paper, here we report on two characteristics: the number of SPAC founders 
and their age. On average 5.91 entrepreneurs found the SPAC and they are 50.59 years old at the 
time of filing.  
 On average, each unit of IPO by SPACs raised close to $128 million, totaling around 
$23.5 billion in IPO proceeds from 2003 to 2012. The smallest SPAC in the sample collected $ 
7.88 million and the largest $1.035 billion. Overall, 96.5% of the money obtained during the IPO 
process is deposited in the trust accounts with financial institution in good standing. This process 
of depositing money in the trust account is important since it provides a guarantee that investors 
in the SPAC would be able to redeem their shares at the pro rata value in case  they disagree with 
a proposed merger combination. Furthermore, it represents commitment of SPAC managers to 
the deal since managers on average invest only $25,000 to form the SPAC and retain 20% of 
common shares after the IPO. The average price of a unit bundle across the sample is $8.08 with 
prices fairly standardized at $6, $8 and $10 respectively. An average unit consists of 1 common 
share and 1.3 warrants. Owners of SPAC warrants have the option to exercise them at $6.30 after 
a successful merger combination. On average, 3.46 underwriters are involved in the IPO of 
SPAC which is approximately 4 times lower than the number of underwriters in a syndicate for 
typical IPO (Corvin and Stultz, 2005). Underwriters across the sample charge SPACs 6.88% of 
12 
 
the gross proceeds for their services. On average 2.3 % of gross proceeds or approximately 33% 
of underwriters compensation is deferred until the SPAC merger outcome.  
The threshold level represents the maximum percentage of SPAC shareholders that could 
redeem their shares before the merger is, on average 32.35%. The last institutional characteristics 
for which we have complete information is the amount of warrants purchased before the IPO by 
SPAC promoters. On average, they buy as a pre-commitment to the deal 2.44 million warrants. 
 
3.2        SPACs’  characteristics across  samples 
 
Comparing SPACs institutional characteristics across the sample, we notice changes in 
their structure over time.
19
 The lowest number of SPAC founders, (5.42), was in the first period, 
while the highest number of SPAC founders, (6.33), was involved in the second period of 
observation. Their age across samples varies with 51.50 being the highest in second period. 
SPAC size in the second period is 2.5 times and 2.7 times larger than the size in period 
one and three, respectively. Various factors may attribute to this difference in size of SPACs 
across the periods, and we believe that market conditions and the financial crisis had an impact. 
It was natural that in the period 2003-2006 SPACs were of the lower size since that was the time 
of their introduction to capital markets, inability to be listed in major exchanges and similar. The 
largest size of SPACs in the second period could represent increased market interest for the 
product and involvement of well known and established financial institutions as underwriters. 
The data on number of underwriters in IPO syndicate shows a reduction of number of 
underwriters in a syndicate over time and possibly points towards greater specialization of 
underwriters. Similarly like for the number of underwriters we report monotonic decrease in the 
                                                 
19
 Appendix B has graphs on relevant characteristics and their changes over time. 
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total amount of underwriters compensation paid by SPACs,( 7.43% vs. 6.94% vs. 4.73%). While 
total underwriters compensation is declining from period to period, the deferred part of 
compensation is increasing from 1.25% of gross proceeds in the first period up to 3.29% of gross 
proceeds in second period. While the deferred part of compensation in the third period is in the 
middle by the amount of gross proceeds it is the largest as the percentage of compensation 
deferred out of total compensation (18.55% vs. 47.30% vs. 47.77%). This information leads to 
conclusion that underwriters were aligning themselves more with merger outcomes in period 
after 2006 than before. 
 Panel B of Table 2 reports that the proceeds deposited in the trust accounts are increasing 
over time from 93% in the first, to 101% in the third period . However, the threshold level that 
determines the percentage of investors that could block a merger increases dramatically from the 
first to the third period (20.47% vs. 84.24%). The increase in threshold level and change in 
voting rights is also reported in Rodrigues and Stegemoller (2011). This reported increase in 
threshold level is the response of SPAC founders to the activism of institutional investors 
reported in previous studies (Lewellen (2009), Tran (2010), Vulanovic (2010), Cumming et al. 
(2012)). The characteristics of a unit as a security changed significantly. In 2003 to 2006, the 
average unit was packaged as 1 share and 1.62 warrants, in the period between 2009 and 2012 it 
consisted of 1 share and 0.97 warrants. In addition to the decrease in the number of warrants 
packaged in one unit over time, SPACs also significantly increased the exercise price for 
warrants from $5.28 in the first to $ 10.12 in the third period. Although the absolute size of 
SPACs is the lowest in the third period, the underwriters and managers sell the units at the 
highest nominal price in the third period, ($7.06 vs. $8.63 vs. $9.57). SPAC founders 
14 
 
monotonically increased their commitment to the inside warrant purchases from period to period 
(0.71 million vs. 3.40 million vs. 4.73 million) respectively. 
4. Merger Determinants and Characteristics 
 
 
4.1 Institutional Characteristics of SPACs that Merged  
 
 
The merger is the ultimate reason of the existence of SPACs. Upon a merger, all vested 
parties experience could positive returns. If SPAC founders are not able to execute the merger 
before at the IPO determined date, they are required to return all proceeds kept in the trust 
accounts to its investors, and liquidate.  
Table 3 reports the characteristics of SPACs that successfully executed business mergers 
for the full sample and compare them with the ones liquidated. This comparison is important 
because in our regression we only use the SPACs that merged and that were liquidated. On 
average, SPAC size of merged companies is $130 million, with SPACs from the 2007 to 2008 
sub-period having almost 3 times larger size than SPACs from 2003 to 2006. As previously 
mentioned, successful SPACs entering the markets in 2003 to 2006 had the lowest amount of 
IPO proceeds deposited in the escrow accounts. 
Panel A in Table 3, reports that merged SPACs are smaller in size than liquidated ones, 
$130.51 million compared with $141.55 million. Merged SPACs have lower amount of trust 
funds deposited in escrow accounts than liquidated SPACs, 0.95% and 0.97% respectively. Both 
the units and warrants of SPACs that merged are priced at the lower value than for liquidated 
SPACs. There is no difference among two groups for the number of underwriters, the threshold 
level and number of warrants purchased by SPAC managers before the IPO. 
 
15 
 
4.2 Merger Determinants 
We evaluate whether important corporate determinants of SPACs impact the probability 
of merger. Thirty seven explanatory variables are used for evaluation and we discuss each of 
them as well as their expected impact on merger. Twelve of these variables are from fourteen 
variables reported on Table 2 and Table 3 and we exclude total underwriters compensation and 
underwriters allowance since we use the parts that make total compensation in our analysis. 
The first set of defining characteristics of SPACs is one on SPAC founders. We reported 
previously the number of founders involved in SPAC (Found_number) and their average age. 
We expect that both of these variables would impact the probability of merger of the SPAC in a 
positive way. The more founders are involved in the SPAC it means that their collective 
knowledge would be beneficial in properly executing first the IPO and latter in finding of target 
company to merge with. Following the same logic we believe that the age of founders should 
have positive impact on merger. In addition to the above variables we construct four additional 
dummy variables that describe founders’ characteristics. Looking in the final prospectuses before 
the IPO we read disclosed information on the founders’ involvement in the blank check issuance 
prior 2003 or in their involvement in another SPAC and create dummy variable Found_SPACs. 
If the SPAC founders were previously involved in blank check industry we code the information 
as 1 for particular SPAC and 0 otherwise. Our expectation is that the previous involvement in the 
blank check industry by SPAC founders may contribute to the increase in the probability of 
merger. In a similar manner we create three remaining dummy variables Found_PEVC, 
Fund_Inst and Sadvisor. The variable Found_PEVC discloses the prior involvement of SPAC 
founders in private equity and venture capital industry. Since SPACs can be considered financial 
innovation or new asset class and by some are recognized as venture capital companies we 
16 
 
believe that prior involvement in private equity and venture capital industry increases the chance 
for successful merger in the end. We have same prediction for Fund_Inst which represents 
involvement or backing of an existent institution in founding of SPACs. Finally we believe that 
SPACs are more likely to merge if their founders in the process of merger seeking include 
special advisors. The variable Sadvisor represents their involvement.  
Underwriters have an important role in the success of SPAC. They work with SPAC 
founders and structure their IPO’s. After the IPO they are market makers for SPAC securities. 
Millstream Acquisition Company, the first SPAC that went public in 2003, is considered an 
innovation of its underwriter an investment bank EarlyBirdCapital. Vulanovic (2010) reports that 
six underwriters participated in at least 20% of SPAC deals.
20
 After the first SPAC successfully 
went public, EarlyBirdCapital participated in more than forty-five IPO’s, either as the lead 
underwriter or as a member of the underwriting syndicate. Lakicevic and Vulanovic (2011) 
report that involvement of EarlyBirdCapital in the underwriting of SPACs increases the 
probability of the merger. For that reason we create dummy variable EBCAP that reports the 
involvement of EarlyBirdCapital as the lead underwriter and believe that their participation 
would positively impact merger outcomes. Following the same logic we create two more 
variables to report the involvement of investment banks Morgan Joseph and Citigroup as 
underwriters and name them Mjoseph and Citi. 
Lakicevic and Vulanovic (2013) report that underwriters charge a typical fee of 7% of 
gross proceeds, but on average defer half of the fee, or 3.4% of gross proceeds, until the merger 
is completed. This behavior aligns the incentives of underwriters with the SPAC founders with 
                                                 
20
 Midsize investment banks Maxim Group, Ladenburg Thalmann, Early Bird Capital, Legend Merchant, Gunn 
Allen Financial and I-bankers were the members of underwriting syndicate for more than 20% of SPACs each. 
Morgan Joseph and Citibank were lead underwriters in approximately 16 and 18 SPACs respectively. 
 
17 
 
respect to the success of the merger. Corvin and Stultz (2005) find that the single strongest 
determinant of whether an underwriter is included in a syndicate is participation in recent 
syndicates led by the same book manager. They argue that the importance of the relationships 
between the issuer and underwriters suggests that syndicate members are expected to play an 
active role in selling IPOs, determining IPO value, or providing aftermarket services.  Pichler 
and Wilhelm (2001) observe similar behavior where syndicate members are required to provide 
an effort that is difficult to observe. Four underwriter related variables are used in our tests. The 
first underwriters’ related variable is the percentage of gross proceeds (UNDgrosspr) that they 
collect at the time of the IPO. We expect that the decrease in underwriters’ compensation would 
be beneficial for SPAC merger outcomes.  The second is the amount of deferred compensation 
(Udef) as a percentage of gross proceeds. Here we expect that the increase in the deferred part of 
compensation lead to the increase in the probability of merger because underwriters commit to 
collect this compensation conditional on merger outcome. The third variable is the number of 
underwriters in the syndicate (Undn). The expectation on the expected impact of number of 
underwriters in syndicate is unclear.  The fourth variable that defines underwriters and 
potentially impacts merger outcomes is the quality of the lead underwriter in the SPAC 
(Und_Q). We construct this underwriter’s quality variable as a dummy, a value of 1 is assigned 
if the underwriter is a lesser known investment bank that participated in the SPAC market since 
the beginning such as: EarlyBirdCapital, Morgan Joseph , Maxim Group, Gun Allen etc. The 
value of 0 is assigned to the SPAC  if the lead underwriter is well known financial institution as 
Citigroup, Bank of America, Meryl Lynch, Lazard and similar. We expect that the involvement 
of less known underwriters who were longer involved in the SPAC underwriting has positive 
impact on merger. 
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SPAC mergers until 2010 and new tender offer introduced by 57
th
 Street Acquisition 
Company were approved by the majority of shareholders in the meeting. In addition to the 
approval by majority of shareholders, SPAC managers and underwriters, in order to proceed with 
that merger, had to secure that only certain number of shareholders redeems their shares before 
the merger. In the first sub period for all SPACs the threshold was 20% of shareholders. This 
threshold rule was an important incentive for hedge funds and institutional investors to 
participate in the SPAC by playing a “yield game“ and by focusing on short term returns.21 
Appendix B graphically depicts the changes in threshold level over time and shows relatively 
large increases. It is expected that higher threshold improves the probability of a merger. 
Two important variables describe the commitment of SPAC promoters to the deal. One 
variable is the amount of proceeds in the trust fund. The second is the number of warrants that 
SPAC promoters buy and deposit before the IPO into trust account (Proceedsintrust). SPAC 
promoters with initial investments of $25,000, purchase approximately 20% equity in a SPAC. 
As the result of these characteristics, every new SPAC investor experiences significant dilution. 
Miller (2008) reports of “warrant overhang” and explains how it leads to high dilution. He 
proposes that in the future, SPACs decrease the number of warrants in a unit. Lakicevic and 
Vulanovic (2013) report approximately 30% dilution if no conversion rights are exercised. If the 
conversion threshold goes up to 20%, the dilution increases to more than 40%. Contributions of 
managers by purchasing warrants lower this dilution effect and we expect positive impact of the 
variable on the merger outcomes. We are uncertain for the effect of the percentage deposited in 
the trust.  
                                                 
21
 It is well known attempt of Goldman Sachs in 200821to create a “Super SPAC” that would focus on long term 
investors and offer them only ½ of a warrant in unit. Super SPAC did not happen but underwriters and SPAC 
founder increased the threshold number by the time. 
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The size of a SPAC ( Grossproceeds) is another determinant that potentially explains the 
success of a merger. Our summary statistics showed that the size varies from period to period 
and most likely corresponds with the state of the financial marker. We do not have clear 
expectation on the size effect. Although it seems that SPAC as a close to a 100% cash entity 
should benefit from its size, it is unknown what the demand is. Additional demand factors could 
play a role. Following the same reasoning, we do not have clear expectation about the impact of 
unit IPO price on the merger.  
Given the dilution effects and warrant overhang, it is expected that the decrease in the 
number of warrants per unit (Warrantsperunit) would be beneficial for SPAC. We are uncertain 
what effect warrants exercise price could have.  
To account for the dynamic in financial markets and environment surrounding SPACs’ 
limited life after the IPO we use variables widely discussed in finance and economics literature 
that potentially capture these changes and potentially impact merger outcomes. They variables 
are named: IPO_Hot; VIX, Russel_2000, Russel_Ann, Ecindex Confid_Exp and 
AnnDays_IPO. We create dummy variable for the state of the IPO market (IPO_Hot) , coding it 
1 for the years when the IPO activity is above the average and 0 otherwise. By definition SPACs 
and other companies are competitors in the IPO market and the higher interest in other 
companies limit the ability of SPACs to raise capital. But it is possible that investor demand 
increases during “hot “ years, enough to both increase the interest in SPACs and other 
companies. Therefore we do not have clear expectations of the impact on SPAC merger of this 
variable. To account for the dynamics of financial markets as a predictive variable we use 
Volatility Index (VIX) created by Chicago Board Option Exchange. SPACs by its structure keep 
all the proceedings in the trust account with credible financial institutions and are prone to the 
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immediate negative consequences of changes in the market. Given that volatility in the markets 
may lead to more willingness of investors to invest in SPAC and potentially higher interest for 
successful merger outcome. 
We use Russel_2000 and Russel_Ann  with the idea to  capture state of the market for 
small stocks in size similar to SPACs , following the approach in the SPAC literature to use 
Russel 2000 index as a benchmark as in  Boyer and Baigent (2007) and Jog and Sun (2007). The 
variable Russel_2000 is created by inputting the daily values of the Russel 2000 index for the 
dates that SPACs did their IPO and Russel_Ann is created by inputting values of the Russel 
2000 index for the days when SPACs announced that they found company to merge with. To 
gauge market sentiment in addition to the above market variables we use Economic Policy 
Uncertainty Index recorded for each SPAC at the date of the IPO and at the date of the merger 
announcement and call the variables Ecindex and Confid_Exp respectively.The  Economic 
Policy Uncertainty Index is constructed weighting the sentiment in the newspaper reporting on 
economic activities in the U.S in Baker et. al. (2012). We do not have clear expectations of the 
impact of these two variables on the merger outcome. Final variable in this group is the 
AnnDays_IPO which simply measures the time between the IPO and the announcement date. 
The longer the time between the IPO and announcement day is the shorter is the time for SPAC 
to conduct the merger in the allowed timeframe. Given this we expect negative impact of this 
variable on merger outcomes. 
Finally, we construct the set of variables that define the nature of the SPAC and their 
merger focus. Variable doubleunit is a dummy with value of 1 if at the IPO two types of units 
are issued. The rest of our dummy variables define the focus of SPAC in general, and than in the 
sense of geography or particular industry. Almost a third of SPACs in their final prospectuses 
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before the IPO do not express any particular industry, market or country where they seek to find 
target to merge. We create variable focus and code it as 1 if SPACs outline their focus toward 
industry, market or country. Possibly the ability to outline the focus of their merger will increase 
the chances to execute one.  We create four variables based on the geographic focus of SPACs 
for the four most frequently targets countries outside U.S . They are China, Israel, Greece and 
India. In a similar fashion we create variables with the focus on either private equity (PEtarget) 
or health sector (HCtarg) in the U.S. For both of these we expect positive impact on the merger 
probability. 
Finally to take into consideration that there are few SPACs that are outliers by size in the 
sample we create dummy variable Sizedummy to take that in account. 
4.3  Regression Analysis and Results 
We use logistic regression to determine the impact of SPAC characteristics on merger. 
The sample includes 163 companies with complete data points on all thirty seven possible 
merger determinants. We exclude from the population of 184 SPACs,  21 SPACs with 
unresolved corporate status at the time of final observation of the sample. We include seven 
SPACs that executed their IPO by issuing units with dual class shares, contrary to Cumming et 
al. (2012). The reason for their inclusion is that  the gross proceeds raised by a second class of 
shares are negligible in comparison to the size of the IPO, and that all other characteristics of 
these 7 SPACs are identical as the rest of the SPACs. Our observed variable is “merged” and is 
coded as 1 if the SPAC successfully merged and 0 otherwise. The results are reported in Table 4. 
The overall predictive power of the determinants of SPACs on merger is in line with 
results reported by Cumming et al. (2012). We discuss variables with statistically significant 
impact on the probability of merger outcome for SPACs. 
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The number of SPAC founders (Found_number)  is positively impacting the probability 
of the merger outcomes. This is the expected the results in respect to our priors. The number of 
underwriters (Undn) has negative impact on the probability of the merger. The size has small 
positive impact on the merger outcome. VIX also had positive impact on the merger outcomes. 
Russel_2000 has slightly negative impact. SPACS with focus on China are more likely to 
execute merger combination. The same is true for SPACs that in their prospectuses have outlined 
focus. In agreement with previous findings the involvement of Early Bird Capital (Ebcap) in the 
SPAC IPO process significantly increases the likelihood of the merger. Finally the further the 
announcement date is from the IPO date the lower is the chance of SPAC to successfully conduct 
the merger transaction. None of the remaining variables have statistically significant impact on 
the merger outcomes  
5. Conclusions 
 
We describe changes in the SPAC structure over time and document that in a relatively 
short time-frame they significantly redesigned their corporate structure by adjusting their size, 
the amount of the IPO proceeds deposited in the escrow accounts, the number of the warrants 
upfront purchased by founders and the percentage of deferred compensation awarded to the 
underwriters. All these changes are attempts by SPAC stakeholders to increase the likelihood of 
merger outcomes. When we test for the impact of these defining characteristics on the merger 
outcomes only some of them show statistically significant impact on merger. As a policy 
suggestion it pays off to have the IPO underwritten by EarlyBirdCapital have a focus and that 
focus be on China. Additionally it pays off to have larger team when entering SPACs market and 
to find the target as soon as possible.  
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Although this paper adds to the existing literature on SPACs by further examining the 
major determinants of SPAC mergers we call for additional empirical investigation. 
.  
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Table 1 
 
Sample Statistics: 
 
The table presents summary statistics for the sample period from August 2003 to June 2012. All 
Specified Purpose Acquisition Companies that conducted The Initial Public Offering in that 
period are classified into four subgroups depending on their corporate status on January 1
st
 2012. 
From the left to the right we report the number of SPACs that: completed the Initial Public 
Offering, the number of companies that completed merger, the number of companies that were 
liquidated and the number of companies that are seeking merger. 
 
Panel A: 
 
 
Panel B:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
IPO Merged % Merged Liquidated % Liquidated Seeking % Seeking
2003 - 2006 78 53 67.9% 25 32.1% 0 0.0%
2007 - 2008 83 43 51.8% 40 48.2% 0 0.0%
2009 - 2012 23 2 8.7% 0 0.0% 21 91.3%
Total 184 98 53.3% 65 35.3% 21 11.4%
Year
SPAC 
IPO's
Merger 
completed
Liquidated
Seeking 
merger
IPO market 
volume
SPACs as 
% of IPO's
2003 1 1 0 0 68 0.014
2004 12 10 2 0 216 0.053
2005 28 24 4 0 192 0.127
2006 37 18 19 0 196 0.159
2007 66 32 34 0 213 0.237
2008 17 11 6 0 31 0.354
2009 1 1 0 0 63 0.016
2010 7 1 0 6 154 0.043
2011 15 0 0 15 125 0.107
Total 184 98 65 21 1258 0.128
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Table 2: Major Characteristics of SPACs for full sample and three subsamples 
 
  
Obs Mean Std. D Min Max
Panel A: Full Sample
Found_number 184 5.91 1.86 2.00 13.00
Found_age 184 50.69 6.90 4.00 63.75
UNDgrosspr 184 4.18 1.71 1.00 9.00
Undall 184 0.40 0.76 0.00 3.00
Udeff 184 2.30 1.53 0.00 5.40
UTOT 184 6.88 1.42 2.25 10.00
Undn 184 3.47 1.78 1.00 10.00
Thres 184 32.35 20.87 20.00 94.40
WI 184 2.44 2.81 0.00 15.60
Grossproceds 184 127.83 150.76 7.88 1035.00
Proceeds in trust 184 0.97 0.05 0.85 1.03
Warrant Strike Prc 184 6.30 1.90 3.00 12.00
Warrants per unit 184 1.30 0.47 0.50 2.00
Unit offer price 184 8.08 1.60 6.00 10.10
Panel B: Subsamples Mean Std. D Min Max Obs Mean Std. D Min Max Obs Mean Std. D Min Max
Found_number 78 5.42 1.64 2.00 10.00 84 6.33 1.99 2.00 13.00 21 6.05 1.80 3.00 9.00
Found_age 78 49.72 7.90 4.00 63.50 84 51.50 5.57 37.00 63.75 21 51.11 7.71 31.33 63.50
UNDgrosspr 78 5.42 1.79 1.00 9.00 84 3.49 0.81 1.50 5.00 21 2.47 0.52 2.00 3.50
Undall 78 0.76 0.96 0.00 3.00 84 0.16 0.42 0.00 2.00 21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Udeff 78 1.25 1.38 0.00 5.40 84 3.29 0.93 0.00 5.00 21 2.26 1.41 0.00 4.50
UTOT 78 7.43 1.50 4.00 10.00 84 6.94 0.66 3.00 9.00 21 4.73 1.11 2.25 7.00
Undn 78 3.85 1.99 1.00 10.00 84 3.27 1.62 1.00 9.00 21 2.76 1.26 1.00 5.00
Thres 78 20.48 2.64 20.00 40.00 84 29.75 8.27 20.00 81.00 21 84.23 10.84 50.00 94.40
WI 78 0.71 1.23 0.00 5.50 84 3.50 3.15 0.00 15.60 21 4.59 1.90 1.50 8.00
Grossproceds 78 76.47 74.89 7.88 528.00 84 190.14 192.77 28.75 1035.00 21 72.83 46.16 18.98 189.93
Proceeds in trust 78 0.93 0.05 0.85 1.03 84 0.99 0.01 0.95 1.03 21 1.01 0.01 1.00 1.03
Warrant Strike Prc 78 5.29 0.70 3.00 8.00 84 6.26 1.14 4.50 11.50 21 10.00 2.49 5.00 12.00
Warrants per unit 78 1.63 0.49 1.00 2.00 84 1.08 0.29 0.50 2.00 21 0.98 0.11 0.50 1.00
Unit offer price 78 7.06 1.41 6.00 10.10 84 8.64 1.25 6.00 10.00 21 9.52 1.25 6.00 10.00
Variable
All SPACs
Period 2003-2006 Period 2006-2008 Period 2009-2012
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Table 3: Major     Characteristics of SPACs: Merged vs. Liquidated and Merged for three subsamples 
 
 
Obs Mean Std. D Min Max Obs Mean Std. D Min Max
Panel A: Full Sample
Found_number 98 5.85 1.97 2.00 13.00 65 5.95 1.74 2.00 10.00
Found_age 98 49.78 7.38 4.00 63.75 65 51.93 5.65 38.25 63.20
UNDgrosspr 98 4.57 1.86 1.00 9.00 65 4.15 1.35 1.50 8.00
Undall 98 0.58 0.91 0.00 3.00 65 0.25 0.52 0.00 2.00
Udeff 98 2.08 1.67 0.00 5.40 65 2.63 1.29 0.00 5.00
UTOT 98 7.23 1.30 3.00 10.00 65 7.04 1.05 3.00 10.00
Undn 98 3.56 1.82 1.00 10.00 65 3.55 1.84 1.00 9.00
Thres 98 25.79 10.63 20.00 88.00 65 25.49 6.42 20.00 40.00
WI 98 2.11 2.61 0.00 12.00 65 2.26 3.05 0.00 15.60
Grossproceds 98 130.51 159.09 7.88 1035.00 65 141.55 157.39 18.98 920.00
Proceeds in trust 98 0.95 0.05 0.85 1.03 65 0.97 0.03 0.85 1.02
Warrant Strike Prc 98 5.77 1.26 3.00 11.50 65 5.92 0.98 4.50 8.00
Warrants per unit 98 1.37 0.49 0.50 2.00 65 1.29 0.46 1.00 2.00
Unit offer price 98 7.74 1.57 6.00 10.10 65 8.13 1.50 6.00 10.10
Panel B: Subsamples Obs Mean Std. D Min Max Obs Mean Std. D Min Max Obs Mean Std. D Min Max
Found_number 53 5.45 1.66 3.00 10.00 43 6.42 2.18 2.00 13.00 2 4.00 1.4142 3.00 5.00
Found_age 53 49.05 8.66 4.00 63.50 43 50.98 5.20 40.00 63.75 2 43.00 8.49 37.00 49.00
UNDgrosspr 53 5.60 1.90 1.00 9.00 43 3.40 0.76 1.50 5.00 2 2.45 0.78 1.90 3.00
Undall 53 0.92 1.04 0.00 3.00 43 0.19 0.49 0.00 2.00 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Udeff 53 1.03 1.40 0.00 5.40 43 3.36 0.91 1.00 4.50 2 2.55 2.05 1.10 4.00
UTOT 53 7.54 1.57 4.00 10.00 43 6.95 0.47 6.00 8.00 2 5.00 2.83 3.00 7.00
Undn 53 3.75 2.04 1.00 10.00 43 3.30 1.54 2.00 9.00 2 4.00 1.41 3.00 5.00
Thres 53 20.00 0.00 20.00 20.00 43 30.19 5.84 20.00 40.00 2 84.50 4.95 81.00 88.00
WI 53 0.81 1.42 0.00 5.50 43 3.64 2.94 0.00 12.00 2 3.65 0.07 3.60 3.70
Grossproceds 53 76.13 84.43 7.88 528.00 43 201.51 200.97 33.12 1035.00 2 45.28 13.13 36.00 54.56
Proceeds in trust 53 0.92 0.05 0.85 1.03 43 0.98 0.01 0.95 1.00 2 1.02 0.02 1.00 1.03
Warrant Strike Prc 53 5.26 0.70 3.00 8.00 43 6.12 1.03 5.00 7.50 2 11.50 0.00 11.50 11.50
Warrants per unit 53 1.62 0.49 1.00 2.00 43 1.08 0.31 0.50 2.00 2 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Unit offer price 53 6.95 1.35 6.00 10.10 43 8.60 1.28 6.00 10.00 2 10.00 0.00 10.00 10.00
Period 2009 - 2012
Variable
All Merged SPACs All Liquidated SPACs
Period 2003 - 2006 Period 2007 - 2008
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Table 4: Regression results: 
Results of logistic regression are reported. The dependent variable is merged which takes value of 1 if SPAC 
merged and 0 if liquidated. All 163 SPACs analyzed have all information on characteristics below.  
 
 
  
Dependent variable: Merged Logit
Variables Coef. Sig Std. Err. z P>z
Found_number 0.362 ** 0.170 2.130 0.033
Found_age -0.046 0.039 -1.190 0.233
UNDgrosspr -0.508 0.603 -0.840 0.400
Udef -0.321 0.682 -0.470 0.637
UTOT -0.188 0.534 -0.350 0.725
Undn 0.000 * 0.178 -1.740 0.083
Thres -0.009 0.051 -0.180 0.860
WI -0.012 0.180 -0.070 0.946
Grossproceeds 0.000 ** 0.000 1.980 0.048
Proceedsintrust -9.368 16.184 -0.580 0.563
WarrantStrikeprice -0.569 0.629 -0.910 0.365
Warrantsperunit -1.849 1.433 -1.290 0.197
Unitofferprice -0.317 0.799 -0.400 0.692
IPO_Hot 0.263 1.528 0.170 0.863
Und_Q 1.178 0.743 1.590 0.113
VIX 0.250 ** 0.127 1.970 0.049
Ecindex -0.016 0.032 -0.500 0.615
Russel_2000 -0.006 ** 0.003 -2.140 0.032
China 2.136 ** 0.870 2.450 0.014
Israel -2.059 1.842 -1.120 0.264
Greece -0.127 1.416 -0.090 0.928
India 0.531 1.682 0.320 0.752
Doubleunit 1.260 3.291 0.380 0.702
Focus 1.461 ** 0.720 2.030 0.042
PEtarget 33.294 4837.139 0.010 0.995
HCtarg -1.093 0.950 -1.150 0.250
Found_PEVC -0.541 0.652 -0.830 0.406
Found_SPACs 0.608 0.672 0.910 0.365
Found_inst 0.439 0.781 0.560 0.574
Sadvisor -0.600 0.619 -0.970 0.332
Ebcap 2.348 ** 1.089 2.160 0.031
AnnDays_IPO -0.009 *** 0.002 -3.880 0.000
Confid_Exp -0.007 0.016 -0.480 0.629
Russel_Ann -0.002 0.002 -1.450 0.146
Sizedummy -24.344 3412.394 -0.010 0.994
Mjoseph 0.478 0.888 0.540 0.590
Citi 1.028 0.966 1.060 0.287
Constant 38.431 16.876 2.280 0.023
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Appendix A: Graphs on SPAC activity from Table 1 
SPAC outcomes by year: 
 
SPAC outcomes by subsample period: 
 
SPAC changes of status year by year 
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Appendix B: Graphs presenting changes in institutional characteristics of SPACs over time 
A: Gross proceeds over time  
 
B: Percent of IPO proceeds deposited in the Trust over time: 
 
 
C. Threshold percentage of investors allowed to redeem shares: 
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D. Exercise price of warrants: 
 
 
 
 
 
E. Number of underwriters involved in  SPAC 
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F. Changes in the price of unit at the IPO over time 
 
G. Number of warrants purchased by SPAC founders over time 
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